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Russia and theWorld: 2 0 1 8 IMEMO
Forecast&Update to the Forecast –
‘The AutumnofOurDiscontent’
EDITOR’S NOTE
BENJAMIN TALLIS
In Issue 3 of volume 26 of New Perspectives (2018), we published the English lan-
guage version of the Russian Academy of Sciences IMEMO Institute’s annual ‘Rus-
sia and the World’ Forecast. Due to the delayed publication of that year’s forecast
we also published a special update – ‘The Autumn of Our Discontent’. Now, as in
previous years we have invited leading European scholars to reflect on and respond
to the Forecast – and to engage in a little predictive work of their own. They gener-
ally note the frozen and fairly grim state of relations between a realist Russia and a
liberal West, neither monolithic nor equally to blame, but both blind to their own
shortcomings and hypocrisies. However, if we take the original meaning of the
Shakespeare line that Irina Kobrinskaya played on in titling the Update, it is the win-
ter of our discontent, not the winter of discontent. It is a hopeful sentiment that trou-
bles may soon be coming to an end, rather than a woeful, melancholic lament. I will
leave it to our readers to discern any signs of spring in this year’s forum, but it should
be a matter of urgency for all those concerned with relations between Russia and the
West to do what they can to hasten a thaw and a brightening of prospects, lest we
all catch cold.
101NewPerspectives Vol. 27, No. 1/2019
101 131
▲
CONTRIBUTIONS:
Winter Is Coming
Mark Galeotti
Mutual Lack of Introspection and the ‘Russia Factor’ in the Liberal West
Minda Holm
The Psychology of Forecasting: Of Foxes, Hedgehogs and a Bear
Tuomas Forsberg
Once More, With Feeling: Russia’s Realist World
Ruth Deyermond
Rejoinder – Between Past and Future: Russia’s World Today
Irina Kobrinskaya
WINTER IS COMING
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The Update to the IMEMO report was entitled “The Autumn of Our Discontent.” It’s
a cute title, it really is – but what follows autumn? The latest Russia and the World
assessment from IMEMO at once looks for grounds for optimism in some of the
more unusual places – not least, Austria – but at the same time accurately reflects a
realistic acceptance, widely held in Russia, that the best case scenario for the im-
mediate future is more of the same, and that a true geopolitical winter, a further
chilling of relations between Russia and the West, is entirely plausible.
RUSSIA ASOBJECT
What is most striking is that Russia is presented throughout this report as object, not
actor. It may be a victim or a beneficiary, but the initiative is always elsewhere. The
US-Chinese trade wars, changes in Turkish foreign policy, European exasperation
with Trump, transatlantic tensions over Iran – all of these are presented as impor-
tant and yet also at a remove; they are the autumnal winds blowing Russia hither
and yon.
On the one hand, the IMEMO report expresses the continued assumption that
Russia somehow represents a rival pole to the US in a Manichean bilateral world in
which any losses to one are necessarily a gain for the other. When German Foreign
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Minister HeikoMaas articulates a belief that Europe and the US are drifting apart and
the EU must step up with a more robust foreign and security role, this process –
what the assessment calls “Europe’s return to pragmatism” – is automatically pre-
sumed to be a good thing for Russia. Yet this is not such a certainty. A distinctly Rus-
sia-averse Poland, for example, is positioning itself to be a lynchpin of Central
European security, with or without ‘Fort Trump’. Meanwhile, ForeignMinister Sergei
Lavrov warns of “unprecedented” Russophobia in Europe (Kommersant, 2018). Glib
assumptions that Moscow will gain from any “transition to pragmatism” need to be
explained and argued for and not simply asserted.
In any case on the other hand, there is this clear sense of Russian powerlessness.
Western sanctions can only be responded to by a “profound adaptation” of Russian
strategy. Western policy towards Moscow is driven by domestic political impera-
tives, and there is nothing, seemingly, that Moscow can do about this. Even where
there is hope, such as in the tensions between Europe and the USA, this is purely be-
cause of forces and factors outside Russia’s borders. IMEMO’s 2017 forecast pre-
sented Russia as “open and ready for strategic negotiations on the entire spectrum
of world issues” but finding “itself alone at the negotiating table” (Dynkin et al.,
2017). Then, the message was that Russia would be able to act, were it not being ig-
nored. Now, there appears not even to be any notion of a potential engagement
and Russian capacity to affect the world.
This even extends to the Russo-Ukrainian conflict, which is, interestingly enough,
placed within the section on trade and energy, as if it could be confined to a spat
over gas tariffs or a dispute over coal exports, as if there were not daily skirmishes
along the line of contact. The report rightly highlights the fragility of Ukraine’s cur-
rent political and economic circumstances, but is, for some reason, quite agnostic
in its overall tone, falling back on the “widespread opinion” that it will drift further
towards the West, and “other Western expert assessments” that there might be a
backwash towards a normalisation of relations with Russia. IMEMO itself appears re-
luctant to express an opinion or make a prediction of its own as to how and whether
Moscow is able to influence matters one way or the other.
RUSSIA AS VICTIM
Nowhere is the sense of Russia being marginalised and maligned more evident than
in the section on the Skripal case – or the “so-called Skripal case”, as the report puts
it. China gets only a couple of mentions, but this affair and perfidious Albion’s Machi-
avellian machinations get a whole section. There is no doubt expressed here that
Moscow is being maligned, and the fact that the OPCW failed directly to confirm
its guilt – when in reality it has neither the mandate nor the capacity to do that in any
case (Hart, 2018) – is treated as proof of this. Charmingly enough, from the point of
view of this British scholar, the result is another expression of the traditional Russian
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belief in the UK’s extraordinary capacity to manipulate the world. London is pre-
sented as using the case not only to distract from the ongoing Brexit debacle (which
is undoubtedly and depressingly true) but also for “consolidating the European
Union,” especially against Russia.
Quite why Theresa May would be interested in consolidating a Union from which
she was busily trying to extract Britain, especially as many of her increasingly des-
perate hopes appear to have been based on trying to exploit divisions on the Con-
tinent, is left unclear. More striking, though, is what is missing: everything else. The
report seemingly does not allow for the possibility that Moscow could conceivably
have been behind the attempted assassination. Presumably Putin’s warning that “trai-
tors will kick the bucket... These people betrayed their friends, their brothers in arms.
Whatever they got in exchange for it, those thirty pieces silver they were given, they
will choke on them” (BBC, 2018) was just empty talk? It also appears not to be aware
or not willing to admit that other factors may also have been at work in determining
the international response: the Mueller Inquiry and the assertions of the United
States government – if not so much the White House – about interference with the
2016 elections; the infamous 2016 ‘Lisa Case’ in Germany; the ardent defence of the
Syrian government in the wake of chemical weapons attacks; the continued inter-
ference in the Donbas; the steady stream of cyberattacks and intelligence intrusions;
the list goes on.
But somehow that is all overlooked. Unless one is determined to believe in a mas-
sive international conspiracy of unparalleled scope, one has to accept that most
Western governments share a belief – right or wrong – in Russia’s extensive ‘malign
activities.’ To so fiercely ignore the backstory that made the Skripal case so catalytic
again demonstrates a determination to paint Russia as the geopolitical victim, which
is in itself a form of passivity, a sense of a country as lacking the capacity to influence,
let alone master its fate.
RUSSIA AS REALIST
On the one hand, the report is suffused with a sense of determined optimism. It
scrabbles around for positive data points, however sad they may sometimes look,
such as that Slovakia, Malta and Luxemburg did not join the wave of expulsions that
followed the Skripal case. Much is also made of Russia’s constructive relations with
Austria, although this was written before the unmasking of a Russian spy who had
worked within the Austrian defence apparatus for almost three decades, and which
Chancellor Sebastian Kurz described as “unacceptable and to be condemned”
(RFERL, 2018).
More generally, though, it is probably accurate in its perception of the coming
winter, and the extent to which Moscow is at the mercy of forces beyond its control,
something that has since been illustrated by Donald Trump’s unilateral withdrawal
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from the INF treaty. While suggesting that Russia’s relations with theWest are largely
worsening because of “diverging narratives and approaches to the key ongoing is-
sues in geopolitics and the world economy” and rather overlooking such issues as
Russia’s annexation of Crimea, intervention into the Donbas, and similar adventures,
the forecast does properly reflect a degree of hopelessness and helplessness. In con-
trast with IMEMO’s 2017 predictions, BRICS is now no longer a great new coalition
full of promise, Le Pen did not win France, and even if Russia is now “psychologically
ready to assume the stately role of a junior partner in bilateral relations” with Beijing,
China seems to have pivoted away (Dynkin et al., 2017).
The essential passivity conveyed by the report may seem at odds with Putin’s ap-
parent belief that the will to act is one of Russia’s strengths. However, this macho per-
sona is more than a little a caricature fostered both by artful Russian efforts to project
an image of confidence, and by lazy Western stereotypes. In practice Kremlin pol-
icy-making tends to be cautious, even in its aggressions. In other words, it too is in-
formed by a keen sense of the strategic disparity between Russia and the West in
general and the USA in particular. The very adoption of the asymmetrical, ‘political
war’ tactics often described (regrettably inaccurately) as ‘hybrid war’ is itself a re-
flection of this awareness. They are a product of the dynamic and often creative ten-
sion between ambition and realism. The desire to assert Russia’s claim to being a
great power in the face of the imbalance of power, and to resist what is seen as a
concerted effort to constrain and diminish it, requires Moscow to find alternative
approaches that capitalise on its own perceived strengths and the West’s weak-
nesses.
Despite the report’s efforts to find silver linings in the gathering autumnal clouds,
it is unlikely that 2019 will see much change in the fundamentals of this relationship.
While there are those in Europe who are unhappy with the current confrontation,
conscious of the costs of sanctions to their own economies, or simply consumed
with other issues, there is little prospect of any substantive change on the other side
of the Atlantic. The midterm elections saw the House of Representatives taken over
by a Democrat Party that has chosen to blame Moscow for its defeat in the presi-
dential elections and that sees playing the Russophobe card also as a way to batter
Trump. The Nordstream 2 pipeline issue, as well as the sanctions on Iran, may well
generate serious tensions between Europe and the USA. However, the thought that
this will somehow lead to greater sympathy for Russia is misplaced.
RUSSIA AS CATCH-22
The USA, after all, has already essentially frozen the new cold war. The recent sanc-
tions, as well as the new wave of ‘crushing’ ones deferred until 2019, are based not
so much on specific, reversible actions as on presumed past misdeeds. While, for ex-
ample, those linked to the annexation of Crimea are intended to be lifted if – as
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though this would ever happen – Russia withdrew from the peninsula, the ones
based on irreversible acts, whether Skripal or election meddling, have no ‘off ramps’
and are likely to remain until Congress feels like lifting them, which is unlikely to be
any time soon (Ashford, 2017).
The choices facing the Kremlin are unenviable ones. On the one hand, it can take
the initiative to de-escalate the confrontation, abandoning its claims to bemore than,
as Barack Obama put it, a “regional power.” The Russians can agree to be good boys
and girls, to accept the terms of an international order that, in their (not entirely un-
justified) view, theWest and above all the USA ignore when it is in their convenience.
They can abandon their claims to Ukraine’s fealty, abandon their support of the Assad
regime, and in the process abandon every hope of being a serious global player. They
might, perhaps, be able to hold on to Crimea, but essentially this would feel and look
like capitulation – because that it exactly what it would be. It is hard to see how the
Kremlin could survive such a humiliation psychologically even if it managed to hold
on to power by force of arms and administrative machinery. When Putin said to the
world, “Nobody listened to us before, now you have to listen to us!”, his words rang
true with many Russians (Kolesnikov and Volkov, 2018).
Besides, all that seems on offer at present is – perhaps, some day – the lifting of
sanctions and a dialling down of hostile rhetoric. The sanctions regime is difficult
but bearable, with the Kremlin having made serious strides to adapt to the wintry
new conditions (Foy, 2018). If retreat is inconceivable, then the only option it can
meaningfully consider is to go on. The hope is that its assertive and disruptive tac-
tics will convince the West to find more positive and imaginative ways of engaging
Russia, or else that theWest will simply be too divided and distracted to continue to
contain it. The very helplessness conveyed not just in the IMEMO report but also in
the statements of many other actors and observers in Russia is ironically grounds
not for passivity, but for continued disruption.
Kobrinskaya appositely quotes Shakespeare’s Richard III in her opening; con-
versely, I cannot help return to a point I’ve made elsewhere (Galeotti, 2018): that
Putin appears to consider himself, like Macbeth, “in blood stepped in so far that
should I wade no more, returning were as tedious as go o’er.” The path is set, the
seasons are turning, and there is nothing anyone can do. Winter is coming, but then
again, the Russians have a long experience of it, and are stacking up the firewood
and stoking up the stove in anticipation of a long, hard frost.
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MUTUAL LACKOF INTROSPECTIONANDTHE
‘RUSSIA FACTOR’ IN THE LIBERALWEST
MINDA HOLM
Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI), Oslo
In the first edition of this Forum, Egbert Jahn (2015) raised the question of the extent
to which IMEMO’s analysis was independent of Russia’s ‘official line’. Jahn’s conclu-
sion was that whilst the 2015 report at times adapted to official foreign policy stances,
it also included sober and realistic analyses. The same question struck me when I was
reading the recently published 2018 report. IMEMO has a strong reputation as a
leading International Relations (IR) research institution in Russia. Their analyses in this
report of trends in the world, particularly in US and Chinese domestic and foreign pol-
icy, are strong. The predominant focus in the 2018 forecast is on the US, Europe and
China, with briefer discussions of both theMiddle East and the post-Soviet sphere. As
in the earlier forecasts, Latin America, Asia (outside China) and Africa are not priori-
tized in their analysis. Climate change and migration, two of the most fundamental
contemporary transnational policy issues, are not discussed in the abridged version.
Whereas the US is seen as increasingly going bilateral or even going solo, Russia is
presented as increasingly integrated in regional structures such as the EEU, SCO, and
ASEAN. Overall, the report thus reflects well the priorities of Russia’s foreign policy.
In 2015, Jahn noted that the report was less nuanced when it came to Ukraine.
This year, that lack of nuance is most visible in the analysis of what the report terms
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as the ‘Russia factor’ in European and US politics. Whilst I to a large extent agree with
the authors that there is one-sided criticism of Russia in the self-defined liberal West,
the lack of reflection around Russia’s own role in the negative dynamic is similarly
problematic. In the update to the 2018 forecast, written in October of that year, the
emphasis is on the crisis of Russia-West Relations, anti-Russian positions and the
Skripal case. Whilst Russia is often given the exclusive negative agency in the liberal
story, here the tables are turned, and the blame for the negative dynamic is ascribed
to a liberal West in need of an external enemy. Where is Russia’s own agency in this
story? If we are to believe this version, the Russian state merely reacts to an antag-
onistic partner defined by ‘anti-Russian hysteria’, and nothing is said of where that
sentiment, however exaggerated or unfair, emanates from. Whilst the roots of the
‘Russia factor’ lie in both past stereotypes and strategic needs, Russia’s own actions
are also clearly part of the cause.
It is by no means unique to Russia that an institute with close ties to official pol-
icy circles also adapts central elements of the dominant, official world view. The
same is palpable in both US and European IR policy circles, where the threat to the
liberal world order is more often than not analysed from the ‘inside’ of the domi-
nant, liberal narrative. Still, this form of one-sidedness is an impediment to any hope
for an improved relationship. That caveat aside, the report also offers sound insight
into and reflections on the world as seen from Russia. But the increasingly antago-
nistic dynamic and lack of introspection on both sides of the divide doesn’t bode
well for the future of Russia-West relations.
THE ‘RUSSIA FACTOR’ IN THE LIBERALWEST
A central theme in the 2018 IMEMO forecast and its later update is the ‘Russia fac-
tor’. To the extent that the ‘Russia factor’ is about the simplified enemy image of
Russia constructed in US and European politics, I sympathize with IMEMO’s ac-
count. Neither fully outside Europe, nor fully inside either, Russia has long been
treated as standing somewhere in between the civilized and the barbarian and this
‘monstrous’ view still holds today (cf. Morozov and Rumelli, 2015). Thus, liberal
Western states tend to treat Russia differently – more harshly – than they treat, for
example, authoritarian non-Western states such as China and Saudi Arabia (strate-
gic interests here also clearly play a role). Given that liberal states often have not
lived up to their own ideals either, it is both understandable and to be expected that
Russia reacts to their strong moralizing critique.
The Western Self is largely viewed as liberal by default, irrespective of the exten-
sive illiberal actions – seen in, for example, the post-9/11 era. Whereas politics is
messy and full of contradictions, Western liberal morality is often presented as some-
how standing monolithically above those contradictory actions: despite torture, a se-
cret extraordinary rendition and detention program and wide-ranging breaches of
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international law, the US Self under Bush Jr. remained decidedly ‘good’. Whilst the
Self’s identity as liberal persists despite violating those liberal principles, states such
as Russia are stigmatized for the same types of violations. That this creates frustra-
tion with those defined as standing on the outside or, better, denied access to the
true inside, should not come as a surprise (cf. Holm and Sending 2018).
The current desire, and/or reflex, to cast Russia as an external enemy is strong in lib-
eral Western epistemic circles. Unwanted domestic political developments are often
connected to Russia based on circumstantial evidence, and/or a reduction of the
agency of others. There is a slippery slope, now often taken in the public imagination,
between asserting that an action or phenomenon may hypothetically be in Russia’s
strategic interest, and a claim that the Russian state is in fact behind it. At the far end
of this logic, there are events that are ascribed to Russian malicious intent based on
speculation alone. One such example in my own country (Norway) was when themi-
gration crisis was at its height in Europe, and it was claimed by commentators on scant
and dubious evidence that Russia was intentionally orchestrating a flow of migrants
over the Northern borders in Norway as a form of hybrid warfare (cf. Rowe andMoe,
2016). Similarly, the arrest of a Norwegian pensioner in Moscow in December 2017
was first cast by experts in themedia as Russian harassment and propaganda. Months
later it was revealed that the pensioner was in fact operating on a mission as a courier
for the Norwegian Foreign Intelligence Service (cf. Standish, 2018).
Another consequential example of an unfounded leap from possible intention to
accusation is found in Timothy Snyder’s popular and influential The Road to Un-
freedom (2018). Snyder claims that Russia’s bombing of Syria in 2015 was a ploy to
impact German politics: “The German government announced that it planned to
take half a million refugees per year. By no coincidence, Russia began bombing Syria
three weeks later... Russia would bomb Syria to generate refugees, then encourage
Europeans to panic. This would help the AfD, and thus make Europe more like Rus-
sia” (2018: 198). Lacking evidence but full of certainty and moral fervour, Snyder
makes a sweeping accusation that looks more like a conspiracy than a factual ac-
count. In the temporal lag between forceful accusation and contra-evidence, the
image of a Russia determinedly undermining the West is strengthened. This is the
logic of coalescing negative stereotypes: that evidence which fits the preconceived
image confirms the stereotype, that which does not is discarded. The biggest chal-
lenge for Russia-West relations, of course, is that in a context of increased polariza-
tion, all of this ‘sticks’, no matter how well-informed the rebuttals of other academics
might be (e.g., Laruelle, 2018; Pinkham, 2018).
RUSSIA ANDTHENATIONAL RIGHT
A related aspect that the IMEMO forecast touches upon is the broader anti-sys-
temic political developments in Europe and the US, which are, at times, heavily
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ascribed to Russian agency. Though it has been compellingly established that a
Russian information campaign directed at the US 2016 Presidential Campaign took
place, the tropes mobilized were mostly existing grievances that the Trump cam-
paign could capitalize upon. I don’t mean that one shouldn’t focus on external in-
fluence campaigns; obviously, though, that problematique does reach far and
more systematically beyond Russian actions (cf. Levin, 2016). But it’s too easy to
give Russia the blame for these political developments, just as it’s too easy to put
the blame on the US or George Soros for the Colour Revolutions in Russia’s neigh-
bourhood. In a similar vein, the finger is pointed toward Russian interference in ex-
plaining the upsurge of the populist and national Right in Europe (cf. Snyder,
2018). In other popular representations it is Putin himself that is striving to break
the European Union apart. Within these stories, complex socio-political processes,
mutual interests and human agency are at times reduced to being de facto strate-
gic pawns of Russian statecraft. Evidence is cherry-picked, as the media point to,
e.g., a Russian bank loan to Marine Le Pen’s Front National in 2014 as evidence of
the Kremlin’s support for her run for presidency in 2017, but say nothing of the
party’s inability to get a new bank loan in 2016 (Sonne, 2018; on the loans, see
Shekhovtsov, 2017: 196–202). Most of the connections between Russia and the far
right have happened on the outside of the Kremlin, and often on the initiative of
the European Right – a point usually left out in stories of Putin breaking up Eu-
rope.
As such, the IMEMO forecast does well in placing the internal political develop-
ments in both the US and the EU at the forefront of their analysis of political trends.
After all, the increasingly staunch anti-liberal postures taken by the national Right in
countries such as the US, Hungary, France, Italy, and Austria are rooted in long-
standing frustrations, both in the electorate and in the political elite. Whilst many of
these movements, such as Lega in Italy, FPÖ in Austria and Rassemblement National
(previously Front National) in France, both admire and seek cooperation with the
Kremlin, that is a far cry from seeing them as products of Russian influence. Nor is
it peculiar to Russia for a government to cooperate with like-minded politicians else-
where, or for states to want to extend their value community beyond their own bor-
ders. And whilst liberal-minded scholars and politicians might not like the values that
the new Right and Russia represent, tolerance and compromise is also central to the
liberal ideology that they want to defend.
LACKOF CRITICAL INTROSPECTION
But, then again, the Kremlin is not making life easy for itself. When facts are con-
tinuously blurred, the reasons for others to speculate also increase. After all, the
Russian state does plenty of things which it implausibly denies. The incident of the
‘little green men’ in Crimea ahead of the annexation in March 2014 is only one
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blatant example of this. Another example, which also happens to be related to this
forecast, is the Skripal case. It is puzzling that the IMEMO 2018 update itself so
easily falls in line with this same form of denialism. Could they not at least have
left some room for speculation? As discussed earlier, I am sympathetic to their cri-
tique of the tendency in self-defined liberal states to cast Russia as the enemy
with little critical introspection. Saudi Arabia has at the time of writing just killed
one of its own citizens on NATO soil, yet without receiving any diplomatic sanc-
tions against it like those that were imposed on Russia. That is indeed a double
standard.
Yet, as is so often the case with Russian official rhetoric itself, the IMEMO au-
thors here fall into the same trap of one-sidedness that they criticize the West for.
Contrary to their claims in the 2018 update, the evidence in the Skripal case does-
n’t seem unconvincing. What was unconvincing was the mock interview with RT
(2018) where the two men accused of the poisoning claimed to be on a holiday to
visit the Salisbury Cathedral. We don’t know what intelligence was shared by the
British to their allies, but we do know that it convinced them enough to carry out
massive expulsions of Russian diplomats. Bellingcat’s (2018) investigation has later
confirmed what many suspected: that the accused men were GRU operatives. As
such, given this denialism and the frustration it creates, it also seems implausible
that the Russian state will succeed in “neutralising [the ‘Russia factor’s’] negative im-
pact”, which is defined as “one of the important and difficult tasks of the Russian
foreign policy in the foreseeable future” (Dynkin et al., 2018a: 1). By reducing the
Skripal case to a “tool for consolidating the European Union and the West as a
whole”, and a “pretext for the latest and [...] toughest sanctions” (Kobrinskaya,
2018), the authors simply disregard all that which Russia has done to contribute to
the negative relational dynamic.
EMOTIONS AND EXPECTATIONS
At this stage, Russia-West relations seem locked in a mutual negative dynamic
where nuances are increasingly left out of representations of the Other. How
does one get out of this? For a start, academics working on these questions have
a particular responsibility not to fall into the traps of unproblematically repro-
ducing simplified enemy images. But it seems difficult, in part because these
questions are for many so inherently emotional. Speaking from the Norwegian
context, where our neighbourly good relations with Russia have traditionally been
balanced with our transatlantic alliance, the academic and political debate on
Russia is so heated now that it has soured relations between long-term friends
and colleagues.
Why are there so many emotions involved? My suspicion is that it is in part re-
lated to the very high hopes many Sovietologists and Russia scholars had for post-
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Soviet Russia. Many of my colleagues who worked with Russia during the 1990s
seem deeply disappointed with Russia, akin to the disappointment one may have
when a family member or friend does not live up to your high hopes for them. Pre-
cisely because Russia was seen as so close to being ‘one of us’, the disappointment
with its authoritarian streak and anti-Western assertiveness is also so high. Born in
1989, I am of an academic and political generation where those expectations sim-
ply did not exist. Yet, the memory of those expectations also means that Russia is
held up to different standards than states such as China, which in turn understand-
ably contributes to the frustration for those on the receiving end of the resulting
stigma. At the same time, and as the editor of this journal rightly pointed out in a
comment, Russia has always claimed to be exceptional; perhaps it is unfair of them
to expect non-exceptionalism in return.
WHAT THE FUTUREHOLDS IN STORE…
The IMEMO forecast notes that Ukraine remains the “main obstacle to the nor-
malisation of the dialogue of Russia with its partners in the world” (Dynkin et al.,
2018: 21). At the time of writing, it was only weeks ago that the conflict between
the two plumbed further negative depths in the Kerch Strait. Whereas the forecast
notes a European fatigue over the conflict, there is also a lack of political will to
concede on both the Ukrainian and the Russian side. More broadly, the conflict il-
lustrates the tension that the IMEMO authors spell out, yet do not reflect upon: in-
creased Russian influence in the world, yet also increasing anti-Russian moods. At
what cost should Russia continue asserting itself? Here, the IMEMO authors treat
the European and US mistrust as arising out of nowhere, or at least as lacking a le-
gitimate basis. Unwilling to critically examine Russia’s own role in the dynamics
with the liberal West, they also fail to reflect upon how the dynamics of increased
influence and increased anti-Russian moods are connected. Nevertheless, the
IMEMO authors are sceptical of the chance for improvement in the Russia-West re-
lationship, stating that they expect the military-political tensions to increase (Dynkin
et al., 2008: 5). They also note that the Russian economy suffers as a result of Rus-
sia’s geopolitical activities. This points to the broader tensions in Russia’s current
strategy: the Kremlin seeks great power recognition on its own terms, yet is unable
to handle the costs. For 2019, it is unlikely that this tension in Russia’s own desires
will be resolved.
In the update to the forecast, Kobrinskaya mentions Putin’s appearance at the
Austrian Foreign Minister Kneissl’s wedding, and the uproar that it created among
the Austrian and wider European public. She questions whether this “strengthen[s]
Russia’s position in Europe and its relations with the Alpine Republic”, but leaves
the question hanging. When preparing the 2019 forecast, I hope they spend some
time and space reflecting on both the potential and pitfalls of an ideological and
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strategic alliance between Russia and the national Right in Europe, the US and
elsewhere. Though the update to the forecast discusses some of these trends
under the heading “Divergence in the West”, it would be interesting to hear more
of their reflections on the Russia-Right connection. After all, it is not only Trump’s
US that is an inspiration to nationalists around the world, as they note in the fore-
cast; the Russian state itself is also heralded as a model for movements wanting
‘traditional values’ and conservatism to play a central role. With the Right gather-
ing forces ahead of the European Parliament elections in May 2019, it will be in-
teresting to see whether Russia decides to build more actively on those
connections.
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THE PSYCHOLOGYOF FORECASTING: OF FOXES,
HEDGEHOGS ANDA BEAR
TUOMAS FORSBERG
Collegium for Advanced Studies, University of Helsinki & Tampere University
IMEMO’s forecast for the year 2018 predicted more stability than change. This is, of
course, understandable since in the short run stability or continuation of present
trends is a safer bet than any prediction of major changes. For the long run, we do,
however, need scenarios of what can change and how, if we want to plan our poli-
tics for the future (Patomäki, 2008: 1).
We all know that forecasting the future is tricky, but there is robust empirical
evidence that some forecasters are better than others. Philip Tetlock and Dan
Gardner (2015) have identified a group of “superforecasters” that constantly per-
form better than on average when predicting future events. Although all human
beings are influenced by diverse biases in their assessments, Tetlock (2005)
claims that cognitive styles affect the capabilities of forecasting. The best fore-
casters are those who are “foxes”, those who know many small things, rely on di-
verse sources of information, think probabilistically, and are self-critical and
skeptical of grand schemes. By contrast “hedgehogs”, who know one big thing
and expand that knowledge to new areas, more often fail in their predictions.
Similarly, Richard Herrmann and Jong Kun Choi (2007) claim that three factors
make forecasting difficult in security studies. First, we lack means to assess the in-
tentions of other actors; second, we have the inclination to believe that power
provides a parsimonious explanation, and third, we have difficulty in grasping the
interactive effect of multiple factors. Avoiding these fallacies leads to better fore-
casts.
In the following, I will discuss a few biases that typically affect predictions in in-
ternational affairs. They are availability heuristics, normalcy bias, confirmation
bias, overconfidence, attribution error, and groupthink. I will discuss how they
are potentially manifest or not in the IMEMO report as well as in the wider Russ-
ian policy debate. I am not claiming here that any of the biases would be unique
to or typical of Russia; on the contrary, they are all very human (Jervis, 1976: 3;
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Pohl, 2005; for the U.S. see, e.g., Yetiv, 2013). Moreover, I am not able to firmly
state where an objective worldview ends and a potential bias starts, since I can-
not claim to know it. Yet, these biases are worth pointing out and discussing as
they may explain why not only IMEMO but most of the rest of us are predicting
stability.
AVAILABILITY HEURISTICS, NORMALCY BIAS AND
CONFIRMATIONBIAS
The tendency to forecast stability can be based roughly on at least three common
biases that are often inter-connected: availability heuristics, normalcy bias and con-
firmation bias. Availability heuristics is a psychological bias that causes people to
focus on examples and analogies that quickly come to mind and neglect those that
are more unfamiliar. Normalcy bias is the belief that basic things will remain the
same as before. Confirmation bias, in turn, is the psychological tendency to search
for, interpret, and recall information that confirms one’s preexisting beliefs. Often the
tendency to see what one expects is turned into wishful thinking, in other words into
the tendency to expect and thereby see what we desire. The more pessimistic coun-
terpart of this tendency is to expect the worst and then see and believe in informa-
tion that confirms our fears.
In the IMEMO report, a largely realist worldview is confirmed: the experts expect
“military political tensions to increase” and the role and impact of international or-
ganizations to decrease. If the experts believe in the prevalence of an anti-Russian
sentiment, it is easy to find evidence that confirms that belief and discard alternative
evidence and interpretations. The IMEMO experts thus assume that the confronta-
tion between Russia and theWest is likely to continue, although there is some scope
for improved relations with regard to Ukraine. There are no prospects for an inten-
sified dialogue about arms control, and in the Middle East too, the prospects of sta-
bilization are deemed as limited. On the other hand, there are somemore optimistic
visions; for example, the IMEMO experts think that the likelihood of a successful
tension reduction on the Korean Peninsula is noteworthy. The report sees that “there
are no basic contradictions among the leading world powers with regard to the sit-
uation in North Korea.”
The prevalence of realism as the basic worldview can be related to availability
heuristics: Russian and Soviet history has been plagued by wars and conflicts, and
the Cold War is the analogy that most quickly comes to mind when analyzing the
present era. Normalcy bias can be seen as supporting the view that living in an en-
vironment that is seen as hostile and strategically precarious is normal and thus likely
to be long-lasting rather than exceptional. However, when “Europe’s transition to
pragmatism, and its improved consideration of its own interests in its relations with
the United States” (Kobrinskaya, 2018) are seen as benefitting Russia, one may sus-
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pect traces of wishful thinking. It can also explain why in IMEMO’s view there is
widespread skepticism towards international organizations in general, but not in the
Eurasian space.
OVERCONFIDENCE ANDTHE ILLUSIONOF IMPORTANCE
One typical error in forecasting is overconfidence. Overconfidence here would
mean inflated beliefs in the success of the larger self, in other words Russia (rather
than IMEMO), in terms of performing better than others and achieving the desired
goals. Overconfidence is often closely connected to two other biases: illusion of
control and illusion of importance. Yet, IMEMO does not present strong views that
would reflect overconfidence. While Russian state representatives typically show a
lot of self-confidence when speaking in public, for example, Vladimir Putin in his an-
nual addresses to the Federal Assembly and presentations at the Valdai meetings,
this tendency is not as clear in IMEMO’s report. The IMEMO experts see Russia’s
role in world politics with some confidence: “The significant role of Russia in world
politics and international institutions, and its presence – including military presence
– and influence in various regions are increasingly recognized by international ac-
tors” and “Russia will no longer appear as an outsider”. They also believe in the
progress of the Eurasian Economic Union integration and the Greater European Part-
nership megaproject as well as in Russia’s growing importance in the resolution of
several crises.
However, otherwise IMEMO is rather careful when assessing Russia’s role in
world politics and warns of many challenges. Moreover, the report admits that the
Russian economy “is not in the best shape”. IMEMO’s economic forecast in re-
gard to the growth of Russia’s GDP – predicting a growth of 2.0% - is rather mod-
erate when compared to most official visions, and is indeed lower than the official
(but contested) figure 2.3% provided by the state statistic agency Rosstat in Feb-
ruary 2019. Nevertheless, this IMEMO report is less concerned about Russia’s fu-
ture prospects than its forecast for 2016, which opined that Russia “risks
permanently falling behind in its development as a modern power” (Dynkin et
al., 2015: 100).
ATTRIBUTION ERROR
The attribution bias is at work when a person or group tends to understand the
behaviour of the other predominantly in terms of its perceived negative inten-
tions, and not as a reaction to its own behavior or to other external constraints.
Tom Casier (2016) has suggested that this bias (on both sides) led to the deteri-
oration of relations between Russia and the EU. In the IMEMO report too, this
bias is most visible in the characterizing of the perceptions of Russia in the West.
“The Russia factor” in the West is regarded as a “tool of political technology” that
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is “effective due to its primitiveness and the appeal to hardy stereotypes”. “Eu-
rope’s negative perception is habitual” and has led to “anti-Russian hysteria”. This
indeed conveys the image that the criticism of Russia in Europe is mainly an out-
come of malevolent intentions and not related to Russia’s own behavior. Russia,
in turn, is just reacting to what it perceives “as a series of confrontational steps”
according to the IMEMO experts. However, somewhat contradicting this logic
of attribution, the experts also hold that a settlement of the Ukraine crisis could
help normalize Russia’s relations with its partners and “overcome the anti-Russ-
ian sentiments”.
GROUPTHINK
Groupthink prevails when the unity and conformity of the group become more
salient than the open-minded and self-critical search for information for analysis and
action. As group norms prevent contradictory information and opinions from being
raised, it can be seen as a meta-bias that strengthens existing biases. For example,
in the run-up to the Ukrainian conflict groupthink may have increased the propen-
sity for risk-taking (Pursiainen and Forsberg, 2017).
It is not possible to know the group dynamics of the IMEMO experts purely on the
basis of the outcome – the report. The IMEMO experts could be seen as a group po-
tentially conducive to groupthink as they mostly share a similar background and pro-
fessional identity. It nevertheless seems that it has been possible to discuss alternative
interpretations, and some of these slightly differing interpretations are traceable in
the report. Contrary to the view often expressed by Russian political leaders that the
EU weak and divided, the IMEMO report believes that the EU is emerging from its
crises, although Brexit, the growth of populism and protests, and the financial crises
in many member states have led to cleavages both domestically and internationally.
In economic issues too, it seems that there is more room for alternative opinions
and deliberation concerning the present as well as the future. By contrast, it is more
likely that groupthink can affect how views on the key issues of foreign and security
policy are formed and expressed in Russia.
CONCLUSIONS
With the year 2018 already passed, it is tempting to review IMEMO’s forecasts
with the benefit of hindsight – as the examined report was written much earlier.
We have seen the beginnings of a peace process in Yemen, and the US question-
ing its support to Saudi Arabia. We have seen the Skripal affair causing new ten-
sions in EU-Russia relations (as noted in Irina Kobrinskaya’s update), despite the
hope for their gradual improvement. We have witnessed the Belarusian President
Alexander Lukashenko criticizing Russia for its aims to incorporate his country.
None of these most recent events and statements, however, directly refute
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IMEMO’s analysis, and largely it has been rather correct when it comes to the key
tendencies.
On the basis of one relatively brief report, it would be too bold to claim that there
truly are certain biases that affect the content of the forecast: the material is too lim-
ited and ambivalent for that. Notionally and suggestively, however, while there are
some elements of bias that can be pointed out in the forecast, overall the analysis
avoids the worst mistakes of this kind. As it relies on a variety of sources this also
means that at some points there are somewhat contradictory claims and pieces of
evidence in the analysis. Although IMEMO’s report can be seen as representing the
elite view and being not too different from the one prevailing in the Kremlin, it nev-
ertheless contains some self-critical elements that hopefully help to reduce psycho-
logical biases, including groupthink. As Isaiah Berlin (1953) pointed out in his seminal
essay, Russian thinkers have been both hedgehogs and foxes. While the Russian
‘Bear’ is inclined to be a hedgehog when focusing on the national interest and power
along the realist doctrine, the IMEMO report shows that also foxes live in Russia.
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ONCEMORE,WITH FEELING: RUSSIA’S REALIST
WORLD
RUTH DEYERMOND
Kings College London
InMan, the State and War, one of the foundational texts of modern, Anglophone In-
ternational Relations theory, KennethWaltz identified three ‘images’, more commonly
termed ‘levels of analysis’, for the study of international relations: the system, the state,
and the individual (Waltz, 2001). The 2018 IMEMO forecast avoids an explicit theo-
retical frame for its analysis of Russian foreign policy and its challenges but the chang-
ing importance of actions at different levels (international, regional, state, individual)
and the interaction between them, shape much of the analysis it presents.
Russia emerges in the forecast as an actor of significance at international and, in par-
ticular, regional levels. At the same time, it finds itself constrained by its own state-level
economic challenges and by the particular character of theUS as a foreign-policymak-
ing actor. Russia is also forced to contend with the impact of the individuals leading
the US and China on global stability and its own relative power. (Despite the impor-
tance attached to Trump and Xi as individuals, however, the impact of President Putin
– an issue of overwhelming concern in most popular, and many academic, Western
analyses of Russian foreign policy – is not considered here.) At each level, relations and
motivations are understood as a product of power or its lack, and policies both result
from and are designed to achieve success in zero sum competitions with peers. The
world of the 2018 forecast, then, is a classically realist one, whereWestern claims about
Russian rule breaking are seen as no more than a tool of ‘political technology’ to ad-
vanceWestern interests andweaken Russia. Russia’s world thus offers little prospect for
cooperation beyond a cautious, limited accommodation of growingChinese influence
in the post-Soviet region. Inmany respects, it continues the themes and concerns of the
2017 forecast but with a greater insecurity regarding Russia’s status, and amore evident
sense of grievance about the actions and hypocrisies of the West.
GREAT POWERS IN THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEMAND
REGIONS
At the international level, the 2018 forecast broadly follows its predecessor. The 2017
forecast characterised Russia as a powerful international actor waiting for other pow-
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erful states to recognise the need for constructive engagement. Although the 2018
forecast reiterates this broad position, the analysis indicates that the problems of en-
gagement with the US, in particular, have grown while the scope of Russia’s power
appears, partly in consequence, to have diminished.
The forecast’s views of international order reflect the Russian governmental view,
evident since at least Putin’s 2007 Munich Security Conference speech (Putin,
2007), of a decaying post-World War II order undermined by US unilateralism. The
first international factor affecting Russian foreign policy in 2018 is identified as the
decline of the UN and other international organisations, “the general degradation
of the system of international law” (p. 145). The weakening arms control and trade
regimes are also areas of particular focus. They are seen as victims of assertiveness
by one or both of the other two states that dominate the creation and management
of international rules, the US and China. The competition between them and their
competition with Russia are understood as the principal sources of global and re-
gional instability. The weakening of arms control is identified as a particularly dan-
gerous issue that is driven by “interest groups in US military and political circles” (p.
155) and creates an environment in which “military incidents and a rapid escalation
of the conflict up to its full scale” become a risk to international security (p. 147). In
this case, as with the other identified threats to international order, Russian govern-
mental activity is not considered as a significant contributory factor. In IMEMO’s
analysis the responsibility rests with the US and, elsewhere, with China. Given the
evidence for Russian INF treaty violations and the attack on international law rep-
resented by the annexation of Crimea, to take just two examples, this assessment is
deeply problematic.
The regional level emerges as central to Russia’s status as a powerful and effec-
tive foreign policy actor, and to its attempt to maintain a carefully managed rela-
tionship with China. Although the forecast repeatedly emphasises Russia’s global
influence, it is only in the Middle East and, to a lesser extent, in the post-Soviet space
that it makes any significant claims to specific successes in this regard. Russia appears
in the forecast as the dominant external presence in the Middle East, acting as a
conflict mediator and developing cooperative relationships with the major regional
actors. The forecast identifies a formidable range of challenges confronting Russia
in the region in the near term – maintaining relations with the most powerful states
in the region despite their conflicting agendas, protecting Russian military facilities,
brokering a settlement in Syria – but these are challenges that come with significant
influence. The risks to Russia here, it seems, are risks arising from success rather than
failure.
Significant Russian influence is also identified in the post-Soviet space, where in-
tegration through regional institutions appears to contradict the broader global
trend of decreasing influence for international organisations identified by the fore-
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cast. Here, however, Russia’s success is more mixed. The forecast acknowledges the
problems of the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) integration (p. 158) but even so,
it identifies its development as a central feature of Russian policy for the future in
terms that manyWestern analysts might regard as optimistic. In contrast to the Rus-
sia-led EEU, the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) is viewed as a regional
tool for managing relations with an increasingly powerful China: “maintaining the
political and military-political balance in Russia’s relations with China” (p. 158) is
represented as one of the organisation’s primary functions. The two organisations
thus perform complementary roles in a region where the historic Russian hege-
mony has declined but where there appears to be a strong desire to prevent its
complete erosion.
Beyond this, the forecast gives limited attention to the states of the post-Soviet
space. Given the importance attached by the Russian government in this century to
maintaining Russian interests in the region (or its sub-regions), often in response to
perceptions of Western expansionism, and the longstanding involvement of Russia
in the domestic politics of many of these states, the limited attention paid here is
surprising. With the exception of Ukraine, the states discussed are considered largely
in the context of relations with third party states and institutions, or as part of a wider
struggle for influence between Russia and the West. Thus, the focus in the discus-
sion of Belarus is mainly on the prospect of improved relations with the European
Union (EU) (p. 161); the analysis of Moldova considers its government’s relation-
ship to Western states and what the forecast characterises as its “traditional use of
anti-Russian rhetoric” and anti-Russian “provocations” (p. 162); and Central Asia,
which is discussed in only four sentences, is considered in relation to the role of
Russian and Chinese regional integration efforts. Perhaps most surprising of all is
that the forecast suggests that the primary focus of the Russian engagement in the
South Caucasus will be on a joint cooperation with Iran. Even the analysis of Ukraine
is significantly reduced when compared with the 2017 forecast. For the authors of
the 2018 forecast, the post-Soviet space appears to have diminished as an area of
significance for Russian foreign policy. Instead, it is presented as little more than a
sphere in which the interests of more powerful states are at stake.
STATES AND PRESIDENTS: RUSSIA ANDTHEUS
While generally locating the responsibility for growing global instability as well as
possible threats to Russia’s influence in the actions of others, the forecast does iden-
tify one important home grown, state-level problem: Russia’s economic weakness.
Its limited growth, resulting from domestic obstacles, is understood as both a cause
and an effect of foreign policy challenges, and the forecast suggests that the Russ-
ian economy is “made to bear the additional burden of expenses and risks from Rus-
sia’s geopolitical activities” (p. 150). The impact of the sanctions – which is discussed
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more forcefully in the update by Irina Kobrinskaya (2018) – is also considered in the
forecast, though not in a context which suggests Russian governmental responsi-
bility for their introduction. (In a clearer departure from the main forecast, Kobrin-
skaya [2018: 170] also makes an explicit link between domestic economic problems
and the decline in Putin’s approval ratings.)
More generally, while the main forecast is willing to consider Russian economic
difficulties as a factor in the wider issue of Russia’s place in the world, it avoids
any discussion of Russian governmental responsibility for the extent to which Rus-
sia remains, as the title suggests, “misunderstood.” Instead, anti-Russian stereo-
typing and “hysteria” are seen as tools of “political technology” used by European
states and the US (p. 144). The forecast identifies the need to overcome this prob-
lem as one of the main tasks for Russian foreign policy. Nevertheless, given the
IMEMO authors’ reluctance to acknowledge any basis in fact for Western con-
cerns about election interference, for example, or any legitimate grounds for the
sanctions against Russia, it is hard to see how this will do more than reinforce pre-
existing assumptions about, and resentment of, Western hypocrisy and Russo-
phobia.
US foreign policy continues to preoccupy the authors of the 2018 forecast as it did
those writing in 2017. Given the widespread discussion inWestern analysis about the
relative decline in influence of the US, and the perception of accelerated decline
under the presidency of Donald Trump, the extent to which the international sys-
tem and international security are still understood as contingent on the policies of
the US is a striking feature of the forecast. Other features of the analysis of the US
are also notable to aWestern reader, particularly the discussions of the US’s foreign
policy and its internal political dynamics. US foreign policy is seen in largely zero-sum
terms, intended to counter or undermine both China and Russia on economic and
security issues while promoting US security and economic interests. In this reading,
the US’s policy in Asia is focused on excluding Russia from technology deals with
India in order to consolidate its own position, while attempting to restrict the ex-
pansion of Chinese political, military, and economic influence in the region, enact-
ing a “limited form of deterrence” (p. 153).
The IMEMO view of US policy on Europe is much the same. The US is under-
stood to be concerned above all with advancing its economic interests in the re-
gion while restricting Europe’s economic relationship with China; meanwhile the
US’s sanctions against Russia are understood as a means of damaging a competi-
tor in the European energy market (p. 154). IMEMO paints a similar picture of US-
Europe security relations, suggesting that a desire to advance its plans for missile
defence (often understood in Russian analyses as a programme targeted princi-
pally at Russia) is seen as one of the main motivations for US military policy in Eu-
rope (p. 154).
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At the domestic level, the forecast presents US political struggles as a contest be-
tween theWashington establishment and the rest of the country, between the Pres-
ident and Congress, and between liberals and conservatives. While this last
oppositional pairing is incontestably central to the current American dysfunction,
the forecast’s views of the other two suggest a curious set of understandings about
the functioning of US politics. It expresses surprise at the fact that the Washington
elite has failed to produce “a united bipartisan front to fight against the President”
but notes that “parallel power structures” have emerged around the presidency and
Congress (p. 152). Both observations, which respectively disregard the profoundly
partisan character of contemporary US party politics and the longstanding (consti-
tutionally mandated) separation of powers between different branches of the federal
government, suggest a view of US politics that owes more to Russian governmen-
tal expectations than to the experience of the US itself.
Finally, but importantly, the forecast places significant weight on the roles of
two individuals occupying presidencies: Trump and Xi. The actions of both, though
in entirely different ways, are presented as central to recent and future changes to
international relations. Xi’s concentration of power is understood as significant not
only for Chinese domestic politics but also for the growing scope and assertiveness
of Chinese foreign policy (pp. 159–160). In contrast, the forecast suggests that
the effect of Donald Trump’s tenure as president has been to increase “unpre-
dictability and uncertainty” (p. 145). Both Trump’s unilateralist tendencies and
what the forecast tactfully describes as his “pronounced personality type” (p. 151)
are seen as destabilising factors with which Russia and other states struggle to
contend. Despite the very limited and carefully worded consideration of the still-
evolving Trump-Russia scandal, the discussion of Trump’s impact on US foreign
policy coherence and on international stability is perhaps the area of the forecast
most closely aligned with mainstream Western analysis of contemporary interna-
tional politics.
2019: THE SONGREMAINS THE SAME
If the 2018 forecast presents a more pessimistic outlook, both for Russia and for in-
ternational stability, than the 2017 forecast, and the update represents a further de-
cline in expectations compared with the 2018 forecast, it is likely that the 2019
forecast will provide an even more negative assessment than these texts. In the ab-
sence of unexpected shocks in other areas, the 2019 forecast is likely to focus on the
same concerns as its predecessors, but with the additional problems created by a fur-
ther year of friction between Russia and Western states and by the build up to the
2020 US presidential election.
The continued domestic economic challenges facing Russia and the impact of
Western sanctions are likely to remain a significant explanatory factor in IMEMO’s
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analysis of Russian foreign policy. They are also likely to continue to affect the do-
mestic political climate, notably the popularity of President Putin. If dissatisfaction
grows in relation to other aspects of government policy, such as the introduction of
internet restrictions (Reuters, 2019), Russia’s domestic economic and political prob-
lems will further inform thinking about Russia’s capacity to act in the world.
As this suggests, friction between Russia and Western states may play an even
more significant role in the future analysis of Russian foreign policy. Despite the un-
certainties created by Trump’s scepticism about NATO, by the reduced trust in the
relationship between the UK and the EU states caused by Brexit (whatever form it
takes, or even if it does not occur), and by the closer relationship of some member
states to Russia (for example, Hungary), NATO is likely to continue to strengthen
both its military presence in sensitive areas of Europe and its diplomatic position in
relation to Russia. Particularly in the context of the weakening or collapse of the
arms control regime, the Russia-NATO relationship may become more adversarial
and be at greater risk of escalation to more significant hostilities.
As in the previous years, the 2019 forecast is likely to view Russia’s relationship
with the West, to a significant extent, through a prism of grievance. The increase in
NATO’s activity, the continued application of sanctions against Russia, and the highly
charged rhetoric of the US presidential campaign are all likely to attract criticism in
2019. The US presidential election campaign, the early phases of which will be well
advanced by the end of the year, is likely to prove particularly poisonous to the US-
Russia relationship, which will in turn affect attitudes towards a range of issues, in-
cluding European security, arms control, Ukraine, and the Middle East. The rhetoric
on Russia from prospective Democratic candidates and from any Republican pri-
mary challengers to Trump will be hostile and accusatory; Congressional and media
discussions of Russian governmental attempts to interfere in the elections are also
likely to contribute to a strengthened perception amongst Russian analysts and politi-
cians that the US political establishment is irredeemably Russophobic. Of course, a
similarly suspicious view of the Western establishment is also likely to endure in the
Russian capital.
The 2018 forecast presented the world viewed through a realist prism; nothing in
the likely developments of the next year suggests that IMEMO’s future analysis will
move away from a view of international politics defined by zero sum competition,
balances of power and the further deterioration of relations between Russia and
Western states.
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BETWEEN PAST AND FUTURE: RUSSIA’SWORLD
TODAY
IRINA KOBRINSKAYA
IMEMO – Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow
Now in its fourth edition, this forum is becoming a tradition, which is especially use-
ful in the context of limited overall dialogue between Russia and the West. This edi-
tion of the forum in particular is interesting in many respects. First of all, since the
discussion of the forecast takes place nearly a year and a half after it was first writ-
ten in Russian, in the format of a fait accompli, this gives the experts a full possibil-
ity to assess how accurate the forecast was, although the time lag inevitably creates
a certain ambiguity of perception and assessments. It can only be noted with satis-
faction that the main trends flagged as most likely in the forecast, have indeed de-
veloped in reality, which was confirmed by the contributors to the forum. Tuomas
Forsberg stresses that “none of these recent events and statements, however, di-
rectly refutes the analysis of IMEMO, and in many ways it was quite correct as far as
the key trends are concerned.” Minda Holm believes that the report “reflects the pri-
orities of Russia’s foreign policy.” The forecast indeed represents how much of the
Russian foreign policy establishment sees the world – and our realist worldview is in-
creasingly vindicated.
The Western experts also note another valuable feature of the IMEMO forecast –
it gives an idea of the spectrum of Russian expert opinion. Forsberg writes, “it seems
that it has been possible to discuss alternative interpretations and some of these
slightly differing interpretations are traceable in the report. […] Sometimes [they are]
even contrary to the views often expressed by Russian political leaders (regarding
[the] EU)”. This concerns economic issues, among others – “it seems that there is
more room for alternative opinions and deliberation concerning the present as well
as the future. By contrast, it is more likely that groupthink can affect how views on
the key issues of foreign and security policy are formed and expressed in Russia”.
And this is true, because regarding the sphere of security the Russian expert com-
munity is dominated by serious concern about the processes of the collapse of the
arms control system.
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The second feature of the current discussion is the emergence of new ap-
proaches to the analysis of IMEMO’s work by the Western contributors. Forsberg
presented his analysis of the IMEMO Forecast from the point of view of ‘Psy-
chology of Forecasting’. Holm writes about emotionality, that is, a subjective, per-
ceptive factor as an essential element of research of Russia in the West. The focus
on the psychology of forecasting proposed by Forsberg not only explains the
specifics of the work, but, moreover, enriches it, and allows experts to better un-
derstand the logic of Russian scholars. Moreover, it allows one, as we say in Rus-
sia, to ‘read between the lines’, especially since the English version of the forecast,
as published exclusively in New Perspectives, is an abridged version of the origi-
nal 150-page, Russian language report. According to Forsberg, the IMEMO fore-
cast shows not just the contraposition, but the synergy of analysis of “the best
forecasters – […] ‘foxes’, […] who know many small things, rely on diverse sources
of information, think probabilistically, [and] are self-critical and skeptical of grand
schemes” – and “‘hedgehogs’, who know one big thing and expand that knowl-
edge to new areas.”
The third traditional feature of the forums is the presentation of a fairly wide
palette of expert opinion in the West, which is especially interesting for researchers
in Russia. However, for perhaps the first time in the history of the forum, the gen-
eral similarity of the assessments is striking. In the opinion of Forsberg, not only
IMEMO but ‘most of us’ are predicting stability. It seems, however, that stability –
that is, the absence of abrupt changes – is only partly a fair definition of the world’s
current processes. Against a stable overall background, we increasingly see ele-
ments of stagnation and degradation of the system. Ratings and wording vary de-
pending on the authors’ positions, but their general assessments of the dynamics
of world affairs do not differ significantly. As Ruth Deyermond has it: “The Song
Remains the Same.”
Perhaps the only issue that causes serious confusion among the colleagues, and
thus requires an explanation, is the so-called ‘Skripal case’. It should be noted, how-
ever, that in the IMEMO forecast there was nothing about it just because it all oc-
curred in March 2018, but the case was touched upon in the update, written by the
author of this text. This case can be attributed to the category of the ‘black swans’,
the increased likelihood of which is stated in the 2018 forecast and also considered
in the autumn update. Despite the available evidence, the case itself remains in the
same category – ‘highly likely’ – and will highly likely remain there. Mark Galeotti and
the other contributors agree that Russophobia is recognized by the Russian author-
ities as a serious problem for Russian foreign policy, and Russia’s actions are calcu-
lated not to create additional precedents for accusations of Moscow’s interference
in the affairs of theWest. Apparently, it should be noted that in the framework of the
Mueller Inquiry, Paul Manafort was accused of financial fraud during his period of
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activity in Ukraine, but not of participating in the ’Russian interference’ in the Amer-
ican elections.
RUSSIA: NEITHEROBJECTNORVICTIM, BUT PARTOF THE
FUTUREWORLD SYSTEM
Galeotti writes: “What is most striking is that Russia is presented throughout this report
as object, not actor. It may be a victim or a victor, but the initiative is always elsewhere.
US-Chinese trade wars, changes in Turkish foreign policy, European exasperation with
Trump, transatlantic tensions over Iran: all of these are presented as important and yet
also at a remove, they are the autumnal winds blowing Russia hither and yon.”
It’s worth recalling that the purpose of the annual IMEMO ‘exercise’ is to predict
trends and events in world politics (and the economy) which will affect Russia and
that will need to be taken into account in the policy-formation and decision-making.
In its forecast, IMEMO does not make recommendations, but notes the expediency
of certain steps on the part of Russia. Complex, sometimes hardly predictable
processes beyond Russia’s borders, have a significant impact on it, but do not lend
themselves to direct counter-action by Moscow. This also applies to all the factors
listed above by Mark Galeotti.
While external factors certainly act on Russia, Russia also acts. An example of this
was the initiative to create the Greater Eurasian Space. Russia’s policy in the Middle
East, where its position has been significantly strengthened, is associated, as rightly
noted by Ruth Deyermond, with serious risks and challenges. In an effort to main-
tain cooperative and balanced relations with all players in the region, Russia has to
take into account all the nuances of the contradictions between them. And on the
whole, it succeeds – as is discussed in the 2019 Forecast, which will be published
later this year in New Perspectives.
The most difficult problem in relations with the West, but above all the US, is the
issue of arms control. Russia – one of the leading forces in the security domain – is
faced with the unilateral approach of the United States, the passivity of Europe and
the detachment of China. Any proper ‘conference table’, i.e. a forum for the pow-
ers of the world to seriously discuss and debate international affairs, as IMEMO
called for in the 2017 Forecast, remains lacking.
Relations between Russia and the West in the next ten to twenty years, at global
level as well as in the Euro-Asian region, will be primarily driven by China’s devel-
opment into an assertive or even offensive player; America’s rethinking of its global
role; and the degradation and disintegration of the post-Second World War system
of international relations, its trade and its military-political institutions and rules. From
a trade-economic and geopolitical point of view, the centre of world development
is increasingly shifting to the East – to the Asia-Pacific region. China has become
the engine of global development and, at the same time, the main challenge for the
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‘West’, or indeed for ‘Western Civilization’, whether that means the civilization of the
US, Europe or Russia.
This situation will not change in the coming years and instead poses ever-greater
challenges for theWest. Europe is cautious, seemingly trying to resist undue Chinese
influence and maintain its own posture, but the newer EUMember States, one after
another, fall victim to the temptation of Chinese investment, particularly through the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The EU’s deep institutional crisis impedes its efforts to
prevent this from happening again in, e.g., Hungary or Latvia. Russia too is put in a
difficult situation by this dynamic: its economy cannot compete with China’s, and it
cannot compete for influence in this way in the post-Soviet space.
A more positive development, however, is that Moscow is no longer afraid, as in
the late 90’s, of the secession of its Far East. With its strengthened international po-
sitions, it is trying to keep in its orbit the former post-Soviet countries and to estab-
lish its Greater Eurasian Space (GES), theoretically in conjunction with the BRI. While
Russia sees the Western states’ difficulty in aligning themselves fully with or against
China because of their civilizational differences, it is, itself, in a different position be-
cause of its unique history and composition. Russia’s strong Eastern components as
well as its strong Western components make it uniquely capable in this regard.
FORECASTING THE FORECAST
The timing of this forum lent itself to also looking forward to the IMEMO2019 forecast,
as well as reflecting on and responding to the 2018 edition. As readers will soon see,
the contributors to the forummanaged to accurately foresee some of the general fea-
tures of the 2019 Forecast, which, with regard to relations between Russia and theWest,
is rather pessimistic, echoing the comments of the contributors: AsMarkGaleotti writes,
The Nordstream 2 pipeline issue, as well as the sanctions on Iran, may well gen-
erate serious tensions between Europe and the USA. However, the thought that
this will somehow lead to greater sympathy for Russia is misplaced.
Minda Holm concurs that “the increasingly antagonistic dynamic and lack of intro-
spection on both sides of the divide doesn’t bode well for the future of Russia-West
relations.” And Ruth Deyermond adds that “it is likely that the 2019 forecast will pro-
vide an even more negative assessment than [the previous forecasts].”
Please, be patient –New Perspectiveswill publish the IMEMO Forecast 2019 soon
– but there is plenty more to address in the contributions in this forum first!
THE RUSSIA FACTOR
Minda Holm goes deeply into the analysis of the roots of what we termed ‘the Rus-
sia factor’:
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To the extent that the ‘Russia factor’ is about the simplified enemy image of
Russia constructed in US and European politics, I sympathise with IMEMO’s
account. Not fully on the outside of Europe, yet not on the inside either, Russia
has historically and now been treated as standing somewhere in between the
civilised and the barbarian […]. Thus, liberal Western states tend to treat Russia
differently – more harshly – than they treat for example authoritarian non-West-
ern states such as China and Saudi-Arabia. […] Given that liberal states often
have not lived up to their own ideals either, it is both understandable and to be
expected that Russia reacts to the strong moralising critique. […] Whilst the
[Western] Self’s identity as liberal persists despite violating those liberal princi-
ples, states such as Russia are stigmatized for the same type of violations. That
this creates frustration with those defined as standing on the outside, should not
come as a surprise.
It’s hard to disagree with Holm. Her arguments make us think about two problems
underlying all the contradictions and difficulties in relations between modern Rus-
sia and the West. The first problem is the ‘search for the Other’. The second is the
problem of ‘civilizational commonality’ and related questions of values. These are
not only interrelated issues, but also issues of our common survival and develop-
ment, and they appear in the contributions of the Western experts too – as when
Holm analyses the problem of right-wing movements in Europe and their widely dis-
cussed links to Russia in the context of the Russia Factor, an analysis we largely con-
cur with. It is thus appropriate to ask two well-known questions once again.
Question 1 : Is Russia Part of Europe?
For centuries, the answer to this question has of course been Yes! And no! Iver B.
Neumann, a brilliant and subtle connoisseur of East-Central Europe, had it right when
‘locating’ the ‘new Russia’ in Europe (more than twenty years ago) but also when
‘identifying’ Russia as Europe’s ‘Other’ (Neumann, 1996b).
Holm also notes this ambivalence or tension in her contribution: “Precisely be-
cause Russia was seen as so close to being ‘one of us’, the disappointment with its
increasingly authoritarian streak and anti-Western assertiveness is also so high. Yet,
it also means that Russia is held to ‘other’ [higher] standards than, e.g., China.” Holm
rightly notes that this contributes to the frustration on the part of those being stig-
matized – us, Russians.
As Neumann notes, human collectives forge identities for themselves partly by
the way they represent other human collectives – their ‘others’. And from the point
of view of European identity formation Russia has consistently been seen as an ir-
regularity. Based on 500 years of writings about Muscovy, Russia and the Soviet
Union, Neumann writes that Russia has quite consistently been represented as just
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having become tamed, civil, and civilized; as just having begun to participate in Eu-
ropean politics; and as just having become part of Europe. Since the Enlightenment
it has, furthermore, been seen as a pupil and a learner, be that a successful one, or
one who should learn but refuses to do so, a truant, or a gifted but somewhat pig-
headed one (in the present). The question of where Russia fits in is a central com-
ponent of contemporary discussions of the European security order, and frequently
their focus (Neumann, 1996a).
Can you imagine today’s Russia, and especially President Putin, as a pupil?! How-
ever, in fact, the attitude of the ‘old’ Europe to Russia has changed slightly – the level
of fear and demonization has increased. This makes relations between Russia and the
West even more complicated than they have been in the 1990s and makes it yet
harder to change centuries-old ways of thinking. However, changing the scope and
context can provide a way to common understanding: in this case that comes
through asking and answering a different question.
Question 2 : Is Russia a Part of Western Judeo-Christian
Civilization?
Absolutely, yes. And without understanding this immutable truth, it is almost im-
possible to move beyond the current state of ‘stalled transition’ and away from the
system built after the SecondWorldWar – for good or bad – to the creation of a sus-
tainable new world order. All of us, both Russia and theWest, are rapidly moving to-
wards a global political disorder. And the reasons for this extremely dangerous drift,
should be sought in the field of political psychology, and value shifts, and along the
civilizational paradigm.
Facing existential challenges – demographic, cultural, and security – from the
South and the East, the Western civilization fails to oppose them with a value-
strong strategy and perspective. Instead, we see the destructive internal processes
eroding the West – the growth of radicalism and populism; the destruction of the
social contract and liberal values under the pressure of globalization; the 4th tech-
nological revolution; and the disruption of the usual social mobility mechanisms,
which increases the layer of precariousness. It should be noted that the social dis-
content and protests in Western democracies, in Russia and in the West do not dif-
fer significantly. Opinion polls in Russia differ only slightly from those of Western
sociology in terms of the crisis of the vision of the future, especially for the mid-
dle class – and their children. The authorities in the countries of the Western civ-
ilization face generally identical social challenges – and Russia is no exception.
The notorious lack of democracy in Russia does not prevent either protests
(though Russian protests are not so large-scale) or freedom in Internet discussions,
in which tens of millions are involved. Yet nobody has a solution – neither Macron,
nor Trump, nor Putin.
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Rather often this discontent on the civilization scale is amplified into rawness, and
the psychiatric vocabulary enters the political analysis texts. On the eve of the elec-
tions in his country, Ukrainian philosopher and political analyst Andrei Yermolaev
writes about a “[d]issociative identity disorder” (Yermolaev, 2019). He anticipates his
text with an epigraph from the famous Russian (Soviet dissident) philosopher Alexan-
der Zinoviev: “we are entering an era of total turbidity of minds and obscurantism em-
anating from the achievements of scientific and technological progress” (Zinoviev,
2006). The same problem is raised by the GermanMarshall Fund: “FromAI to 5G, the
innovations that pose unprecedented opportunities also pose a risk to democracy –
and there is no consensus yet on how to solve this puzzle” (GMF, 2019).
Still, among the basic reasons for this state of wide-scale and deep social disorder
is a weakening civilizational tissue, a disorientation in values. Practically a century
ago in a Russia devastated by revolution the famous Russian writer Mikhail Bulgakov
made his personage Professor Preobrazhensky formulate the diagnosis that “[the]
devastation is in our heads” (Bulgakov, 2015 [1925]). Now the disease needs heal-
ing on the scale of the whole Western civilization.
The events of the last year show the formation of the habit of living apart in Rus-
sia and Europe. At the same time, the fatigue from this state of affairs is quite obvi-
ous, including in Europe. It is unrealistic to expect radical changes in the near future.
But without a return to the values of the Western civilization in the world, which
Wolfgang Ischinger rightly characterizes as ‘post-truth’ and ‘post-American’, for both
Russia and the West a way out of the current crisis is hardly possible (Munich Secu-
rity Report, 2017).
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